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CIVIL PROCEDURE: PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-THE ECONOMIC
REALITY APPROACH
THE AUTHORiTY of a state to require a foreign corporation to sub-
mit to the personal jurisdiction of its courts has been a difficult and
frequently litigated problem.' Although the issue has remained
the same, the context in which it is discussed constantly changes as
the states seek to extend their jurisdictional power. A recent New
Jersey case, Hoagland v. Springer,2 dealt with this question in an
action arising from an explosion in New Jersey of a truck engine
sold and installed in Michigan.
The defendant, Cummins Diesel Michigan, Inc., was one of 50
independent distributors of an Indiana manufacturer. Working
under distributorship arrangements involving close ties with the
manufacturer and cooperation among distributors, defendant fre-
quently exchanged needed parts with its New Jersey counterpart,
and the latter was occasionally authorized to service engines sold
by the defendant. Nationwide service to customers made possible
by this type of cooperation was used to promote defendant's business.
The Hoagland case arose when defendant authorized the New
Jersey distributor to repair a diesel truck engine previously sold and
installed by defendant in Michigan. Subsequently, on the New
Jersey Turnpike, the engine exploded and the driver of the truck
was injured. Action for damages was instituted by the driver against
defendant and others in New Jersey, with service of process being
made on Cummins Diesel Michigan, Inc. by registered mail. Upon
challenge of its jurisdiction, the court concluded that the economic
realities of the arrangement among the manufacturer and the dis-
tributors yielded "one, cohesive, economic unit" in the pursuit of
business profits and supported assertion of jurisdiction over the
Michigan defendant 3
'See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 569 (1958); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HA.V.
L. Rav. 909, 919-54, 998-1017 (1960); Note, 47 GEo. L.J. 542 (1958).
275 N.J. Super. 560, 183 A2d 678 (App. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 39 N.J. 32, 186 A.2d
679 (1962).
3 Id. at 569, 183 A.2d at 683.
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At common law the situation in the instant case would have
precluded jurisdiction, since the requirement of physical power4
over the defendant coupled with the federal nature5 of our court
system limited jurisdiction to the state of incorporation. However,
it was clear from the outset that this jurisdictional concept is not
suited to dealing with a corporate entity whose existence is mani-
fested only through the acts of its agents, particularly since these
acts are neither limited to nor necessarily focused in the state of its
creation. With the tremendous expansion of commerce, 6 the pres-
sure and need for more liberal jurisdictional standards led to the
adoption of other theories on which jurisdiction could be based,
including, inter alia, a presumed right of a state to coerce consent to
suit as a price for doing business or an inferred presence of a corpora-
tion from the extent and manner of its activities.7
These rigid, fictional determinants soon proved equally unsatis-
factory and the necessity of their existence was discarded by the
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington." In their
place, the flexible standard of fair play and substantial justice
required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was
put forth as the only limitation.9 In applying the International Shoe
doctrine to specific fact situations, the Supreme Court has found that
even a single contact by mail may be sufficient to support jurisdic-
tion.10 Furthermore, the fact that the cause of action does not arise
out of defendant's activities within the state is not fatal."1 However,
a territorial restriction yet remains in that defendant must initiate
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the benefits and
privileges of the forum state.12  In the Hoagland case this territorial
interest requirement was easily fulfilled by the interstate commercial
dealings among distributors.
'See HENDERSON, THE PosrrIoN OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 77-80 (1918).
5See Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal
System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196, 197-200 (1957); Stimson, Omnibus Statutes Designed to
Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48 A.B.A.J. 725 (1962).
6 The effect of this expansion is discussed in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51
(1958), and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
7 See Kurland, supra note 1, at 577-86; Developments in the Law-State-Court Juris-
diction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 919-23 (1960); Note, 47 Gxo. L.J. 342, 347-48 (1958).
8 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'Id. at 316-19.
10 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
't Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
22 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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Since New Jersey statutory limitations add no further restrictions,
the Hoagland court had to consider only the limitations imposed
on its jurisdiction by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.13 However, in factual situations similar to that found in the
instant case, many courts have felt constrained to look for some
agency relationship 4 or to examine the degree of control exercised
over the domestic entity. 5  Such tests have value in that, where
agency or control is found, this is sufficient evidence of satisfactory
contacts to insure fairness. However, courts utilizing this analysis
will fail to assert the full extent of jurisdiction allowed by the
Constitution. 0
In the Hoagland case, although the court found sufficient "un-
controverted facts" to warrant recognition of the New Jersey dis-
tributor as a special agent of the defendant, 17 it chose to avoid in-
volvement with such restrictive factors and based its decision on the
broader ground of economic reality. Accordingly, the mechanics,
purpose, and effect of the economic' relationship between the dis-
tributors and the manufacturer were examined. The court found
that defendant's scheme for success depended partially upon dealings
with the New Jersey distribtuor which resulted in an economic
benefit to the defendant. 8 Being unwilling to allow defendant
"the fruits of its New Jersey activities without the attendant liabili-
ties," 9 the court granted jurisdiction.
Previously, New Jersey courts have interpreted due process to re-
1 N.J. Rvxs RuL.as 4:4-4 (d) provides that service of process can be made on a
foreign corporation by registered mail "subject to due process of law." This, of course,
parallels the constitutional requirement and has been so interpreted by the New
Jersey courts. See Dowd v. Boro Drugs, Inc., 70 N.J. Super., 488, 495-98, 176 A.2d 13,
17-19 (App. Div. 1961).
1 See, e.g., Supreme Wine Co. v. Distributors of New England, Inc., 198 F. Supp.
318 (D. Mass. 1961) (corporation held agent of defendant where it sold exclusively
defendant's product); Shoultz v. Revolvator Co., 186 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (sales
representative did not have power to bind its principal); H. F. Campbell Constr. Co.
v. Palombit, 347 Mich. 340, 79 N.W.2d 915 (1956) (dealer who received goods on
consignment held agent).
1 5 See, e.g., Kahn v. Maico Co., 216 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1954) (selling price, adver-
tising, and other policies controlled); Republic Supply Corp. v. Lewyt Corp., 160 F.
Supp. 949 (E.D. Mich. 1958) (substantial control through distributorship contract);
Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237 Miss. 660, 115 So. 2d 309 (1959)
(distributor possessed absolute control over dealer's method and manner of doing
business).
is See note 32 infra.
17 75 N.J. Super. at 569, 183 A.2d at 683.
Is Ibid.19 Id. at 570, 183 A.2d at 684.
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quire that the cause of action must arise out of defendant's activities
within the forum state.20 Although this connection may be implicit
in the eventual decision,2' the court did not attempt to relate the
cause of action to defendant's contacts prior to examining them in
the light of fair play and substantial justice.22 It could be inferred,
therefore, that the court did not consider fair play and substantial
justice to depend upon such an intermediate analysis.
The logical extension of the economic reality approach adopted
by this court would seem to be: Whenever there is exploitation of
the forum state for profit by a non-resident, it is not unreasonable
to allow jurisdiction, subject always to other factors bearing on
fairness. However, it does not necessarily follow that where there
is no exploitation there will be no jurisdiction, since other contacts
may appear which will establish the requisite fairness.23
This approach would also seem applicable to those situations in
which a domestic corporation is a subsidiary of a foreign corpora-
tion and jurisdiction of the parent is sought on the basis of its
activities in the forum state through its subsidiary. At one point in
the Hoagland opinion the court said that it was not important that
20 See, e.g., Malavasi v. Villavecchia, 62 N.J. Super. 510, 163 A.2d 214 (L. 1960); Note,
47 GEo. L.J. 342, 353-55 (1958). See also Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing
Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REV. 249, 264 (1959) (sug-
gests broadening of the requirement to include consequences occurring within the
state). But see 108 U. PA. L. Rnv. 131 (1959), for a critical appraisal of this approach
as applied by a federal court to a suit brought in California.
Ample support can be found, however, for defendant's contention that the cause
of action, if any, arose out of defendant's acts in Michigan. See Johns v. Bay State
Abrasive Prods. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950); Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 405
Pa. 12, 173 A.2d 123 (1961). A few states might look to the injury as the consummation
of a tort within the state and rest jurisdiction upon that basis. See Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IIl. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Atkins v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
22 Nor would the pronouncements of the Supreme Court seem to require such a
relationship. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)i it was
stated that: "[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against.it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activi-
ties.... It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those -which
do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative ... Whether-due process is
satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the actd'lty in-relation
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure." Id. at 318-19. Accord, Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
23 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (non-resident motorists statute); Nelson
v. Miller 11 Ill. 2d, 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (commission of a tortious act within
the state).
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the Indiana manufacturer chose to sell its goods through independent
distributors. 24 Logically, therefore, it should be equally unimportant
that a parent corporation chooses to sell through its subsidiary,'5 since
the "economic well-being" 26 of each unit of the empire still directly
affects the success of the other units.
Presently, however, courts faced with the jurisdictional ques-
tion in such parent-subsidiary situations look solely to the extent to
which the formalities of the separate entity concept have been pre-
served.27 If the corporate formalities have been maintained, the
parent's position is, analytically, the same as that of any other in-
dependent contractor dealing .with-the subsidiary, and it should be
subject to jurisdiction on the same basis.28  Applying an econoinic
reality approach would ldad. to allowing jurisdiction whenever the
operational purposes of the.parerit ind subsidiary were intertwined.
For example, where the subsidiary was formed for the purpose of
selling the parent's products, its operational purposes would support
jurisdiction. The emphasig thus .oyduld be taken away from the
form of the business relatioiship and placed on the purpo.e'and
result. This should more "satisfactorily. insur6. the "fair play and
substantial justice"29 -songht--to'.-, serve--y the, due process
requirement..-.., " ........
Exploitation of a state by a foreign corporation should prove to
be a constitutionally acceptable basis for the further breakdown of
territorial jurisdictional limitations and, as such, is of value.80 How-
24 75 N.J. Super. at 569, 183 A.2d at 683.
25 See Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis.
L. REv. 522, 563. But see Dowd v. Boro Drugs, Inc., 70 NJ. Super. 488, 503-04, 176
A.2d 13, 22 (App. Div. 1961) (dictum).
"125 N.J. Super. at 569, 183 A.2d at 683.
27 See leading case of Canntln Mfg: Co v; Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925),
where the court found the subsidiary to be completely dominated by the parent but
denied jurisdiction because they wge distinct corporate entities. Accord, Harris v.
'I0eer'e 3&'Co7, 223 F.2d 161 (4th tir. :1955); Fergus Motors, Inc. v. Standard-Triumph
.!otor*Co., i30 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.;Y, 1955); Dowd v. Boro Drugs, Inc., 70 N.J. Super.
-488,'503-04,'176-A.2d 13, 22 (App. Diy. 1961) (dictum). See Note, 56 CoLmtn. L. Rm.
A9;.409-10 *(1956); Note, 44 IowA L. tz,. "345, 358-59 (1959).
" $ee Empirc'?Steel Corp. v. S upefior'Cbii,.56 Cal. 2d 823, 829-30, 834-35, 366 P.2d
502, 60-06,"59,'117 Cal. Rptr. 150,153- 4,'i 7 (1961), 9 U.C.L.A.L. izv. 249 0962);
Nbtei Vt.PA. L. REv. 381, 403-06 (1955).'
"InTernaiional Shoe Co. v. 1Vashirqgtrn, '36 U.S. 310, 316. (1645).8 oTb of such an. 3.  . , . 5.'ln .,
rhe.onstuitionality of such an ieAlon 'would seem to folo as another
product of the increasing trend of commerce t. become na\idnain'scope. This has
been thfe movi iforce behind changing prewopus concepts of jurisdictional limitations.
Compaie International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945), where it was
stated that in most instances it is not unreasonable to require a foreign corpori.i6n
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ever, it is doubtful that even the Hoagland court will accept the
suggested implications and extensions of its rationale within the im-
mediate future.31 But the step is a short one, and the movement of
other states toward the same ultimate end should provide impetus
for such recognition. 2
conducting activities within a state and enjoying the benefits and protections of the
laws of that state to respond to a suit resulting from those activities, with the implica-
tions of the Hoagland decision, which seem equally reasonable. A corporation which
obtains a profit from the forum state through activities conducted in the normal course
of its business has per se received the benefits and protection of the laws of that state
and should accordingly be subject to the jurisdiction of state tribunals.
8±See the recent decision by the same court in Dowd v. Boro Drugs, Inc., 70 N.J.
Super. 488, 176 A.2d 13 (App. Div. 1961), where the court dismissed a previous decision
as not being made on a business relationship rationale. The court also, in dictum,
recognized the continuing vitality of the doctrine enunciated in Cannon Mfg. Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925), that, where the parent and its subsidiary
are separate corporate entities, jurisdiction must be denied.
3 2Several states have specifically provided by statute that sending products into
the state for use, sale, etc., will subject the parties concerned to the jurisdiction of the
state's courts. See CONN. GEN. STAT. Rxv. § 33-411 (c) (3) (Supp. 1959); FLA. STAT. § 47.16
(1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (3) (1960). These statutes should provide a result
similar to that of the economic reality approach of the New Jersey Court in the instant
case and should arrive at that position more quickly and with more certainty. How-
ever, even with these specific statutes, the extent of jurisdiction taken will still depend
upon the willingness of courts to exercise the full power granted. See Berkman v.
Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957) (FLA. STAT. § 47.16 held not to
overrule the separate entity doctrine of Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
supra note 31); Jenkins v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Fla.
1962) (FLA. STAT. § 47.16 construed narrowly); Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,
245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (3) [now § 55-145 (a) (3)]
held unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case).
Illinois and Minnesota have achieved a similar result through judicial interpreta-
tion of statutes allowing jurisdiction where a tortious act is committed within the
state. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I1. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d
888 (1960).
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